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was insolvent, (4) was made on or within 90 days before filing for bankruptcy, and (5) enabled
the creditor to receive more than it would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding.”6
However, because title to real estate is governed by state law, which may be at odds with
the Bankruptcy Code’s central policy of the equality of distribution among creditors, it is unclear
whether a transfer of real estate title may be avoided as a preference under section 547(b) even if
all of the elements of that section are satisfied. The confusion originated as a result of the
Supreme Court’s decision in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.,7 which interpreted section 548 of
the Bankruptcy Code, and held that transfers of real estate title could not be avoided as
fraudulent. Section 547(b) is similar to section 548, which also deals with avoidance of transfers.
However, where section 547(b) deals with avoidance of transfers as preferential, section 548
deals with avoidance of transfers as fraudulent.8 Nevertheless, because transfers of real estate
title could not be avoided as fraudulent in BFP, lower courts began to wonder if based on BFP,
transfers of real estate title could not be avoided as preferential as well. While some jurisdictions
refused to adopt the reasoning in BFP regarding fraudulent transfers to preferential transfers,
others willingly extended BFP to preference actions.
This article explores the split in three parts. Part I outlines the origin of the split through a
discussion of the Supreme Court’s holding in BFP. Part II discusses how various jurisdictions
refuse to adopt the Supreme Court’s holding in BFP regarding section 548 to preference actions
under section 547(b) through a plain language approach. Part III, on the other hand, discusses
how other jurisdictions extend BFP to preference actions based on federalism and policy
concerns.
Discussion

Id.
See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
8
11 U.S.C. § 548.
6
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I.

The Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code in BFP
creates a split among lower courts over whether a transfer of real estate title may be
avoided as a preference.
In BFP, the Supreme Court interpreted section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code which

governs avoidance of fraudulent transfers.9 Under section 548, a transfer may be avoided as
fraudulent “if the trustee can establish (1) that the debtor had an interest in property; (2) that a
transfer of that interest occurred within one year of the filing of the bankruptcy petition; (3) that
the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer or became insolvent as a result thereof; and
(4) that the debtor received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such
transfer.”10
Specifically, to determine whether a debtor could avoid a mortgage foreclosure sale as a
fraudulent transfer, the Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of “reasonably equivalent value”
in section 548.11 Its analysis focused on the plain language of the statute as well as public policy
and federalism concerns regarding state interests in securing property titles.
As with all statutory analysis, the starting point is the plain language. The plain language
of section 548 includes the term “reasonably equivalent value” not fair market value. Indeed, if
Congress wanted “reasonably equivalent value” to mean “fair market value,” it would have
drafted the statute accordingly.12 Thus, by definition, Congress contemplated that reasonably
equivalent value is the foreclosure sale price obtained at a regularly conducted mortgage
foreclosure sale.13 Not, fair market value because “‘fair market value’ presumes market
conditions that, by definition, simply do not obtain in the context of a forced sale,” and thus,
“[m]arket value cannot be the criterion of equivalence in the foreclosure-sale context.”14

Id.
11 U.S.C. § 548; see BFP, 511 U.S. at 535.
11 See BFP, 511 U.S. at 535.
12 See id.
13 See id. at 545.
14 See id. at 538.
9
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Further, adopting a different meaning of “reasonably equivalent value” would require
“foreclosure sale[s] to yield a certain minimum price beyond what state foreclosure law
requires.”15 Because state foreclosure laws are imperative in securing “titles to real estate” and
maintaining “the general welfare of society” within the state,16 “[t]o displace traditional state
regulation . . . the federal statutory purpose must be ‘clear and manifest.’”17 Importantly, this was
not the case regarding section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.18 Because the federal statutory
purpose in section 548 was not “clear and manifest,” Congress did not intend to displace state
law in the foreclosure realm with a definition of “reasonably equivalent value” that would be
inconsistent with state law. Accordingly, “‘reasonably equivalent value,’ for foreclosed property,
is the price in fact received at the foreclosure sale, so long as all the requirements of the State’s
foreclosure law have been complied with.”19 Given the meaning of “reasonably equivalent
value,” a debtor cannot avoid a transfer of real estate title as fraudulent through a regularly
conducted mortgage foreclosure sale.20
It is precisely the reasoning employed by the Supreme Court in determining both the
meaning of “reasonably equivalent value” in section 548 and refusing to displace state law that
sparked the disagreement among lower courts as to whether transfer of real estate title may be
avoided as a preference.
II.

The Majority View: BFP does not apply to preference actions under section 547(b)
of the Bankruptcy Code because the plain language of section 547(b) differs from
that of section 548.

See id. at 542-43.
See id. at 544.
17 See id.
18 See id.
19 See id. at 545.
20 See id.
15
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Courts, including the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,21 the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania,22 and the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas,23 have declined to extend BFP to
preference actions under section 547, holding that transfers of real estate title may be avoided as
preferential. These courts distinguished BFP’s policy issues and focused instead on the plain
language of section 547.
To be a preferential transfer under section 547, the transfer must be (1) made to or for the
benefit of a creditor, (2) made for an antecedent debt, (3) made while the debtor was insolvent,
(4) made on or within 90 days before filing for bankruptcy, and must (5) enable the creditor to
receive more than it would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding.24 These
elements are distinctly different from those to avoid a fraudulent transfer which include
establishing that (1) that the debtor had an interest in property; (2) that a transfer of that interest
occurred within one year of the filing of the bankruptcy petition; (3) that the debtor was insolvent
at the time of the transfer or became insolvent as a result thereof; and (4) that the debtor received
less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer.25 Because these elements
do not have any commonalities, the holding in BFP is inapplicable and has no precedential
value.26 The reasoning employed in BFP in determining the meaning of “reasonably equivalent
value” cannot extend to section 547 as those terms do not even appear in that section of the

See In re Hackler & Stelzle-Hackler, No. 18-1650, 2019 WL 4309510, (3d Cir. Sept. 12, 2019) (holding that if all
of the elements of section 547 are satisfied through a transfer of real estate title, that transfer may be avoided as
preferential).
22 See In re Andrews, 262 B.R. 299 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that BFP has “no bearing” on section 547 of
the Bankruptcy Code).
23 See In re Whittle Development, Inc., 463 B.R. 796 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2011) (holding that because the term
“reasonably equivalent value” does not appear in section 547, BFP is inapplicable).
24 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
25 11 U.S.C. § 548.
26 See In re Hackler, 2019 WL 4309510, at *4.
21
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statute.27 “No such legal issue presents itself in avoidance actions under section 547(b).”28
Additionally, for the same reason, concerns about displacing state law with a particular definition
of “reasonably equivalent value” are unwarranted in the preference context.29 Thus, the meaning
of the language in section 548 is inapplicable to section 547.30
Moreover, although section 547’s requirement that a “creditor [] receive more than it
would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding”31 seems similar to section 548’s
requirement that “that the debtor received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
such transfer,”32 the two requirements are nevertheless different. The meaning of “reasonably
equivalent value” has “no bearing” on whether the creditor received “more” than it would have
“without the foreclosure sale and in a liquidation under Chapter 7.”33 Indeed, “[i]f Congress
intended some other result [in § 547(b)(5)], it could have used terms such as ‘reasonably
equivalent value’ or adopted a bright line standard such as seventy percent of fair market value.
Instead, it chose to use the term ‘more.’”34 Thus, “the only thing that must be shown is that the
creditor did, in fact, receive more from the pre-petition transfer than it would have under a
Chapter 7 liquidation” proceeding.35 Therefore, by focusing on the specific and unambiguous
language of section 547, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas declined to extend BFP to preference
actions and held that transfers of real estate title may be voided as preferential.

See id.
See In re Whittle Development, 463 B.R. at 801.
29 See In re Hackler, 2019 WL 4309510, at *4.
30 See id.
31 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5).
32 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A).
33 See In re Andrews, 262 B.R. at 304.
34 See id. at 306 (citation omitted).
35 See In re Whittle Development, 463 B.R. at 800.
27
28
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III.

The Minority View: The federalism and policy concerns outlined by the Supreme
Court when interpreting section 548 in BFP similarly apply to preference actions
under section 547(b).
Conversely, some courts including the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western

District of Pennsylvania36 and the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan,37 extend the Supreme Court’s reasoning in BFP to section 547(b). Indeed, these courts
acknowledge that BFP dealt with section 548, but hold that the Supreme Court’s rationale in
BFP applies to section 547(b) in light of the essential federalism and policy concerns present in
mortgage foreclosure sales and especially tax foreclosure sales.
States have an important interest in maintaining the finality of foreclosure sales and
“enacting laws governing foreclosure of real property.”38 Avoiding transfer of real estate title
threatens “the essential sovereign interest in the security and stability of title to land,”39 leading
to uncertainty of title ownership. Further, Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to
displace state regulation even in preference actions.40 Indeed, the “intent of Congress to displace
traditional state regulation . . . must be ‘clear and manifest.’ Otherwise, the Bankruptcy Code
must be construed to adopt rather than displace preexisting state law.”41 Congress did not
provide “clear and manifest” intent to override state law when enacting § 547(b).42 Thus, even
though section 547 does not contain a requirement for “reasonably equivalent value,” and
specific concerns about how a different meaning of “reasonably equivalent value” would

See In re Pulcini, 261 B.R. 836 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2001) (finding that the Bankruptcy Code does not override state
law governing titles to real estate, and thus, holding that transfer of real estate title may not be avoided as
preferential).
37 See In re RL Mgmt. Grp., LLC, No. 13-51849, 2014 WL 197692, (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 2014) (holding that
Congress did not intend to displace state law regarding titles to real estate and that avoiding transfers of real estate
title would impose significant burdens on state governments).
38 See In re Pulcini, 261 B.R. at 844.
39 See id.; see also In re RL, at *5-*6 (“[T]he general welfare of society is involved in the security of titles to real
estate and the power to ensure that security inheres in the very nature of [state] government.”) (citations omitted).
40 See id.
41 See id.; see also In re RL, at *6.
42 See id. at 844-45.
36
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displace state law does not exist in this context, section 547’s unique requirements should also
not be read as to override state law. Because, allowing the avoidance of preferential transfers
would infringe on state foreclosure regulations, transfers of real estate title cannot be avoided.43
Further, in the tax foreclosure sale context, avoidance would impair state governments
from collecting taxes, and thus, from performing their governmental responsibilities, burdening
state governments and local municipalities, and leaving an adverse impact on citizens.44
Allowing avoidance of tax foreclosures would disrupt the finality of foreclosure judgments and
thus, would impair “the financial health and well-being of taxing government units and their
citizens.”45 Indeed, taxes enable governments to “carry out essential [] functions for the benefit
of their citizens.”46 Avoidance would “allow properties to fall into disrepair and [] impose on the
government unit a substantial period of uncertainty of title” resulting in an increase of abandoned
and hazardous properties.47 Accordingly, avoidance imposes an “improper burden” on state
governments.48 Therefore, by realizing the importance of a state’s interest in the finality of
mortgage and tax foreclosures, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania and the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan adopt
BFP to preference actions under section 547.
Conclusion
Given the Supreme Court’s decision in BFP where the court held that a transfer of real
estate title could not be avoided as fraudulent, the Third Circuit and lower district courts are split
as to whether a transfer of real estate title may be avoided as a preference under 11 U.S.C §

See id. at 844.
See In re RL, at *5-*6.
45 See id. at *6.
46 See id.
47 See id.
48 See id.
43
44
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547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Third Circuit and lower district courts decline to extend the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in BFP regarding avoidance of fraudulent transfers under section 548
to preference actions under section 547 because the plain language of section 547 differs from
that of section 548, and thus, BFP is inapplicable. Accordingly, for real estate title to be avoided
as a preference, a debtor need only satisfy all of the elements of section 547(b). However, other
district courts extend BFP to preference actions and hold that transfer of real estate title cannot
be avoided as a preference, because maintaining title to real estate is an essential state interest
and Congress did not intend to displace state laws by enacting section 547.
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